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I. INTRODUCTION
I think it's salutary to ask yourself, over and over, if
what you believe is true or just expedient, true or just
comfortable or worse, just profitable? Truth is never
finally entirely graspable, but neither is it entirely unknowable; glimpses of it come to the courageous, the
curious, the diligent . . . .1
Intuitively, can a state tax the federal government? Most people
respond to this question with a resounding “NO!” However, there are
a few people—primarily state, city, and county officials—who believe the federal government owes them something more in the form
of excise taxes on the purchase of property. This Comment proposes
clear and rational reasoning to explain why the Federal National
Mortgage Association (hereinafter “Fannie Mae” or “Fannie”), the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (hereinafter “Freddie
Mac” or “Freddie”) (together the “Entities”), and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (hereinafter “FHFA”) should be regarded as exempt from paying state transfer taxes on the recording of real property deeds. The core of this Comment rests on the supposition that it is
error to conclude that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac must pay transfer
taxes on the purchase of real property. Decisions to the contrary are
counterintuitive to a majority of legal decisions and principles concerning the immunity of government instrumentalities from “all taxation” imposed by any local taxing authority.2
1.
Tony Kushner, 10 Questions for . . . Tony Kushner, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/04/readersopinions/kushnerquestions.html?pagewanted=all (emphasis added).
2.
12 U.S.C. § 1723a(c)(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
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This Comment proposes that Congress explicitly provided federal instrumentality status to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and also
provided clear and unambiguous exemptions to Fannie, Freddie, and
FHFA from “all taxation now or hereafter imposed by any State, . . .
county, municipality, or local taxing authority,” with the exception of
any real property owned by the Entities or FHFA.3 What is more, the
United States Supreme Court has consistently held that Fannie and
Freddie are federal instrumentalities created by Congress to serve
vital roles for the welfare of the public.4
This Comment provides an in-depth analysis of arguments supporting Fannie, Freddie, and FHFA’s exemption from “all taxation”
by states and local taxing authorities. Part II provides a brief history
and background of Fannie, Freddie, and FHFA. Part III presents a
brief discussion of the federal statutes exempting Fannie, Freddie,
and FHFA. Part IV presents a survey of state transfer tax statutes.
Part V reviews the most relevant cases concerning the transfer tax
issue. Part VI offers evidence of Fannie’s and Freddie’s label as government instrumentalities, including Congress’s intent to establish
Fannie and Freddie as instrumentalities and historical and contemporary cases holding the same.
Part VII is the crux of this Comment. Part VII proposes that
precedents such as M’Culloch v. Maryland and Osborn v. Bank of the
United States hold that states do not have legal authority to tax an
instrumentality of the federal government.5 Rather, the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution expressly provides that the
federal statutes exempting the Entities from state taxation are supreme over the state transfer tax provisions; the plain language of the
exemption statutes clearly and unambiguously exempt the Entities
from state taxation; and the term “all taxation” includes excise taxes
(e.g., a sales tax), as well as direct taxes. Part VIII concludes by contending that as conservator of Fannie and Freddie, the FHFA is
charged with taking any action “necessary to put the regulated entity
in a sound and solvent condition,” and any action “appropriate to carry on the business of the regulated entity and preserve and conserve
3.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1723a(c)(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (Fannie Mae); 12 U.S.C. §
1452(e) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (Freddie Mac); 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(2) (2006 & Supp. II
2008) (FHFA) (emphasis added).
4.
See infra Part VI.
5.
See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 317 (1819); Osborn v. Bank of the U.
S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
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the assets and property of the regulated entity.”6 As named federal
agencies, and with the fact that Congress explicitly provided a taxation exemption to the FHFA when acting as a conservator, Fannie,
Freddie, and FHFA are exempt from state transfer taxes.7
II. THE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE
MAC, AND FHFA
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were originally created by Congress as federal instrumentalities in 1938 and 1970, respectively.8
However, both became private, publicly traded corporations—Fannie
Mae in 19689 and Freddie Mac in 1989.10 FHFA is a federal agency
created in 2008 to act as conservator of the Entities and the Federal
Home Loan Banks.11
Reacting to the Great Depression, the New Deal policies led by
President Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to create a governmentsponsored entity to combat the widespread foreclosures and disparate
interest rates consuming the national mortgage market.12 President
Roosevelt’s National Emergency Council suggested the creation of
Fannie Mae and other housing agencies in order to provide “a program for long-term, federally-insured mortgages and the creation of
national mortgage associations to purchase these mortgages.”13
In 1970, under the Emergency Home Finance Act, Congress created Freddie Mac to purchase conventional mortgages,14 while at the
same time also permitting Fannie Mae to purchase the same mort-

6.
12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(D) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
7.
See id.; 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(1)-(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Nevada ex rel.
Hager v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1218 (D. Nev.
2011).
8.
Government Sponsored Enterprises, FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY,
http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=33 (last visited Dec. 28, 2012).
9.
12 U.S.C. § 1717 (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
10.
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, 12
U.S.C. §§ 1451-1459 (2006).
11.
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat.
2654 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4617 et seq. (2006 & Supp. II 2008)).
12.
Julia Patterson Forrester, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Mortgage Instruments: The Forgotten Benefit to Homeowners, 72 MO. L. REV. 1077, 1081 (2007).
13.
Id.
14.
Pub. L. No. 91-351, § 303, 84 Stat. 450, 452-53 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C.A. §§ 1421-1428(a) (West, Westlaw current through 2012 session)).
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gages.15 “Freddie Mac was expected to purchase mortgages from savings and loan associations, while Fannie Mae was expected to purchase primarily from commercial banks and mortgage banks.”16
Soon after the housing market crash of 2008, FHFA replaced the
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) as conservator of the Entities.17 FHFA is an independent agency of the federal
government that was created on July 30, 2008, by way of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008.18 “The Act gave FHFA the
authority necessary to oversee vital components of our country’s secondary mortgage markets—Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks.”19
Following the collapse of the housing market and the looming
financial market crisis, Congress placed the Entities under FHFA’s
control. “On September 6, 2008, the Director of FHFA placed the
Entities into FHFA's conservatorship ‘for the purpose of reorganizing, rehabilitating or winding up [their] affairs.’”20 Congress recommended that FHFA be granted conservatorship of the Entities because the ability of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to achieve “their
public missions is important to providing housing in the United
States and the health of the Nation's economy, [therefore] more effective Federal regulation is needed to reduce the risk of failure of the
[Entities].”21 The director of FHFA, James Lockhart III, United
States Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson, and Federal Reserve Bank
Chairman, Ben Bernanke unanimously agreed with Congress that in
order to ensure the financial soundness of the Entities and the mortgage market, FHFA should be placed as conservator of the Entities.
With a very turbulent market facing our nation, the
strengthening of the regulatory and supervisory over15.
Pub. L. No. 91-351, § 201, 84 Stat. 450, 450-51 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 1717(b) (2006 & Supp. II 2008)).
16.
Forrester, supra note 12, at 1081 (referencing James E. Murray, The Developing
National Mortgage Market: Some Reflections and Projections, 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
441, 445-46 (1972)).
17.
About FHFA, FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY,
http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=4 (last visited Dec. 28, 2012).
18.
12 U.S.C. § 4511 (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
19.
FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY, supra note 17.
20.
12 U.S.C. § 4617(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2008), quoted in Oakland Cnty. v.
Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 871 F. Supp. 2d 662, 664 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
21.
12 U.S.C. § 4501(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
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sight of the 14 housing-related GSEs is imperative.
FHFA's mission is to provide effective supervision,
regulation and housing mission oversight of Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac and the Federal Home Loan Banks
to promote their safety and soundness, support housing finance and affordable housing, and support a stable and liquid mortgage market.22
Moreover, Henry Paulson provided that FHFA was appointed
conservator of the Entities to “provid[e] stability to financial markets,
support[] the availability of mortgage finance, and protect[] taxpayers—both by minimizing the near term costs to the taxpayer and by
setting policymakers on a course to resolve the systemic risk created
by the inherent conflict in the GSE structure.”23
Under conservatorship, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac operate to
“provide liquidity, stability and affordability to the mortgage market.”24 Fannie and Freddie present mortgage companies, banks, and
other financial institutions the opportunity to access funds on reasonable terms, which in turn allow the banks and financial institutions to
offer affordable loans to finance housing.25 “Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac buy mortgages from lenders and either hold these mortgages in
their portfolios or package the loans into mortgage-backed securities
(MBS) that are sold to the public.”26
III. FEDERAL STATUTES EXEMPTING FANNIE AND FREDDIE FROM
STATE TRANSFER TAXES
Pursuant to their missions as creators of “secondary market facilities for residential mortgages” and “provide[rs] [of] stability in the
secondary market for residential mortgages,”27 the Entities purchase
a myriad of mortgages throughout the country. The Entities then lo22.
FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY, supra note 17.
23.
Press Release, Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Paulson Statement on Treasury and
Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets and Taxpayers (Sept.
7, 2008), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1129.aspx.
24.
Government Sponsored Enterprises, FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY,
http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=33 (last visited Dec. 28, 2012).
25.
See id.
26.
Id.
27.
12 U.S.C. § 1716 et seq. quoted in Oakland Cnty. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency,
716 F.3d 935, 937 (6th Cir. 2013).
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cate a buyer for a foreclosed property, convey the property, and record the deed.28 However, when the Entities offer the deed for recording, they claim they are exempt from paying the transfer tax under
both federal and state law.29
Congress exempted the Entities and FHFA from “all taxation”
imposed by any state, county, or municipality, providing an exception for taxes on real property.30 Specifically, Fannie Mae’s federal
charter maintains that Fannie Mae, “including its franchise, capital,
reserves, surplus, mortgages or other security holdings, and income,
shall be exempt from all taxation now or hereafter imposed by any
State, . . . county, municipality, or local taxing authority,” with the
exception of any real property owned by Fannie Mae.31 Similarly,
Freddie Mac’s charter provides that Freddie Mac, “including its franchise, activities, capital, reserves, surplus, and income, shall be exempt from all taxation now or hereafter imposed . . . by any State,
county, municipality, or local taxing authority,” with the exception of
any real property owned by Freddie Mac.32 Likewise, in accordance
with its authority over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,33 Congress
granted FHFA, as conservator of the Entities, “including its franchise, its capital, reserves, and surplus, and its income, shall be exempt from all taxation imposed by any State, county, municipality, or
local taxing authority,” with the exception of any real property
owned by FHFA in its conservator status.34
IV. STATE TRANSFER TAX STATUTES REQUIRING FANNIE AND
FREDDIE TO PAY TAX ON THE RECORDING AND TRANSFER OF
PROPERTY
Across the nation, many states have enacted statutes that seek to
collect taxes from the transfer and recording of real property purchased within their respective borders. The following statutes from
28.
Oakland Cnty. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 871 F. Supp. 2d 662, 664 (E.D. Mich.
2012).
29.
Id.
30.
12 U.S.C. § 1723(a)(c)(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (Fannie Mae) 12 U.S.C. §
1452(e) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (Freddie Mac); 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(2) (2006 & Supp. II
2008) (FHFA).
31.
12 U.S.C. § 1723(a)(c)(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (emphasis added).
32.
12 U.S.C. § 1452(e) (emphasis added).
33.
12 U.S.C. § 4511(b)(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
34.
12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(1), (2) (emphasis added).
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Illinois, Ohio, and North Carolina establish how states collect taxes
on the transfer and recording of real property within the state, county,
or municipality.
A.

ILLINOIS TRANSFER TAX

Illinois requires purchasers of real property to pay tax on the recording and transfer of the property deed.35 Illinois taxes transfers of
property within the State and levies an obligatory privilege tax of
$0.50 per every $500.00 of assessed real property value, notwithstanding an applicable exemption.36 Counties then collect the tax and
deposit the revenue into the treasury.37 The county board of each Illinois county levies an excise tax of up to $0.25 for each $500.00 of
the real property’s assessed value on the transfer of real property,
notwithstanding an applicable exemption.38 Similarly, the Illinois
Complied Statutes permit home rule counties and home rule municipalities, correspondingly, to levy a subsequent excise tax on transfers
of real property, notwithstanding an applicable exemption.39 However, deeds of real property acquired and transferred by “any governmental body or from any governmental body” are exempt from the
transfer tax statutes.40
B.

OHIO TRANSFER TAX

Ohio has two county taxes, both of which are paid by the grantor
of a real property deed before the deed is recorded.41 The first tax is a
mandatory statewide tax that requires the auditor in each county to
collect $0.10 per $100.00 of the value of the transferred real property.42 The second tax authorizes each county to levy a transfer tax on
35.
35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 200/31-1, et seq. (2012 State Bar Edition).
36.
35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 200/31-10 (2012 State Bar Edition).
37.
Id.
38.
55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-1031 (2012 State Bar Edition).
39.
55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-1031.1 (2012 State Bar Edition); 65 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/8-3-19 (2012 State Bar Edition).
40.
35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 200/31-45 (2012 State Bar Edition) (providing that transfers of real property “acquired by any governmental body or from any governmental body”
are exempt under Article 31); 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-1031(a) (“All deeds . . . exempted in
Section 31-45 shall also be exempt from any tax imposed pursuant to this section.”).
41.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 319.54(G)(3), 322.02 (West, Westlaw current through
2012 session).
42.
Id. § 319.54(G)(3).
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real property “[f]or the purpose of paying the costs of enforcing and
administering the tax and providing additional general revenue for
the county . . . at a rate not to exceed thirty cents per hundred dollars
for each one hundred dollars . . . .”43
C.

NORTH CAROLINA TRANSFER TAX

North Carolina imposes transfer taxes, which are collected following the conveyance of real property, but prior to presentation of
the deed for recordation.44 North Carolina’s excise tax collects $1.00
per $500.00 of value transferred from the grantor.45 The county is
then authorized to retain 2% of the tax proceeds in compensation for
the county’s effort in “collecting and remitting the State’s share of
the tax.”46 North Carolina also authorizes at least six counties to levy
an additional transfer tax of $1.00 per $100.00 of value transferred
from the grantor.47
V. CASES THAT HAVE DEALT WITH THE TRANSFER TAX ISSUE
A.

OAKLAND COUNTY V. FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY
(ROUND I)

States won a preliminary victory after the District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of
Oakland County.48 The Oakland County v. Federal Housing Finance
Agency decision arose from certain Michigan county representatives
who demanded that the defendants—Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and
FHFA—pay the Michigan Real Estate Transfer Tax49 and the County
Real Estate Transfer Tax.50 “The statutes impose[d] a tax by the State
of $7.50 per $1,000 in value on the property sold, and by the County
43.
Id. § 322.02(A).
44.
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 105-228.30(a) (West, Westlaw current through 2012
session).
45.
Id.
46.
Id. § 105-228.30(b).
47.
Complaint, Henderson Cnty. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 2012 WL 3191437, at
¶ 10 (W.D.N.C. 2012) (No. 1:12-cv-216).
48.
Oakland Cnty. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 871 F. Supp. 2d 662, 671 (E.D. Mich.
2012).
49.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 207.521 et seq. (West, Westlaw current through
2012 session).
50.
Id. § 207.501 et seq.
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of $1.10 per $1,000.”51 In holding Fannie, Freddie, and FHFA liable
for both of the transfer taxes, the court reasoned that the federal statutory exemption from “all taxation” applied only to direct taxes, as
opposed to excise taxes.52
The court further ruled that Fannie and Freddie were not government instrumentalities and thus were not exempt under the Michigan statute.53 The court reasoned that, under the Supreme Court’s
decision in United States v. Wells Fargo Bank and numerous other
Supreme Court cases, Michigan’s Transfer Tax is an excise tax
“which is levied upon the use or transfer of property,” whereas a direct tax is “levied upon the property itself.”54 However, assuming
there would be subsequent litigation concerning the transfer taxes,
the court certified for appeal the legal issue of whether the federal
statutes exempting the Entities and FHFA from “all [state and local]
taxation” apply to transfer taxes imposed under Michigan statutes,55
stating that “[t]here is substantial ground for difference of opinion as
to that question . . . .”56
B.

NEVADA EX REL. HAGER V. COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS
SERVICING, LP

The District Court for the District of Nevada ruled in favor of
Fannie Mae and FHFA after plaintiffs brought suit under Nevada’s
False Claim Act.57 In Nevada ex rel. Hager v. Countrywide Home
Loans Servicing, LP, plaintiffs filed suit “on behalf of the State of
Nevada and all seventeen counties in the State.”58 Plaintiffs claimed
that Fannie and FHFA, among others, were required to pay transfer
taxes59 under Nevada statute.60 Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the
Entities and FHFA purchased “thousands” of properties and transferred the same amount of titles while “completely or partially”
51.
Oakland Cnty., 871 F. Supp. at 663-64.
52.
Id. at 670.
53.
Id.
54.
Id. at 667 (quoting United States v. Wells Fargo, 485 U.S. 351, 356 (1988)).
55.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 207.501 et seq. ; Id. § 207.521 et seq..
56.
Oakland Cnty., 871 F. Supp. at 671.
57.
Nevada ex rel. Hager v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP, 812 F. Supp.
2d 1211 (D. Nev. 2011).
58.
Id. at 1213.
59.
Id.
60.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 375.030(2) (2009).
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avoiding payment of transfer taxes.61 In granting Fannie and FHFA’s
motion to dismiss, the court held that although “Fannie Mae is not a
federal instrumentality for taxation purposes,”62 FHFA “is an independent agency of the federal government who has authority over
Fannie Mae.”63 As such, the court found that while under conservatorship with the FHFA, Fannie Mae is statutorily exempt from taxes,
penalties, and fines to the same extent as FHFA.64
C.

HAGER V. FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION

The Entities and FHFA won another victory following a decision
by the District Court for the District of Columbia, which held that
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were exempt from District of Columbia's recordation tax.65 In Hager, plaintiffs brought a reverse false
claim66 alleging that the Entities and FHFA “knowingly invoke[d]
exemptions to which they were not entitled.”67 The D.C. recordation
statute imposes a recordation tax (excise tax) when “‘[a] deed that
conveys title to real property’ or ‘a security interest instrument is
submitted for recordation.’”68 The court narrowed the issue to a single legal question: whether the Entities are, in fact, exempt from the
recordation tax.69 The court answered in the affirmative, reasoning
the language of the federal statutes exempting Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac “is sweeping and unambiguous.”70 The Entities “shall be
exempt from all taxation imposed by D.C., with a single, narrow exception all agree is inapplicable here. The recordation tax is undoubtedly a form of taxation imposed on the Entities. That should be ‘the

61.
Nevada ex rel Hager, 812 F. Supp. at 1214.
62.
Id. at 1215.
63.
Id. at 1217 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 4511(a)-(b) (2006 & Supp. 2008)).
64.
Id. at 1218.
65.
Hager v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 882 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2012).
66.
D.C. CODE § 2–381.02(a)(6) (2011). The District of Columbia False Claims Act
authorizes damages against a person who “[k]nowingly makes or uses, or causes to be made
or used, a false record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or
transmit money or property to the District.” Id.
67.
Hager, 882 F. Supp. 2d at 109.
68.
D.C. CODE § 42–1103(a)(1)(A), (a)(3) (2011), quoted in Hager, 882 F. Supp. 2d
at 108.
69.
Hager, 882 F. Supp. 2d at 111.
70.
Id.
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end of the matter.’”71 Plaintiffs urged the court to allow them to file
an amended complaint. However, the court ruled that “because no
new allegations could cure the complaint's core deficiency, amendment would be futile.”72 Accordingly, the court dismissed the complaint with prejudice.73
D.

OAKLAND COUNTY V. FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE
AGENCY (ROUND II)

What was seen as a preliminary victory in the first Oakland
County district court case turned into a disaster when the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down an appeal that took the wind out
of the States’ sails. The court held that Fannie, Freddie, and FHFA
were, in fact, exempt from Michigan’s transfer tax.74
The court began their opinion with this subtle revelation: “In an
effort to get around the plain language of the exemption statutes, [the
Michigan counties] argue that when Congress exempted the defendants from ‘all taxation,’ it did not intend to exempt them from state
and county real estate transfer taxes.”75 The major issue before the
court was whether the congressional exemptions from “all taxation”
exempted the Entities from Michigan’s state and county transfer taxes.76 The court first examined the actual language of the exemption
statutes and found that the “statutes at issue . . . plainly state that defendants are exempt from ‘all taxation.’”77 Although neither “all” nor
“taxation” is defined in the statutes, the “everyday understanding” of
the terms should be implied.78 Basically, the court interpreted “all
taxation” to include just that—all taxation from state and county
transfer taxes.79
71.
Id. at 111-12 (emphasis added) (quoting Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508
U.S. 402, 409 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
72.
Hager, 882 F. Supp. 2d at 113 (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962)).
73.
Id.
74.
Oakland Cnty. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 716 F.3d 935, 944 (6th Cir. 2013).
75.
Id. at 936 (emphasis added).
76.
Id. at 939.
77.
Id. at 940 (emphasis added).
78.
Id. (citing Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 53 (2006)).
79.
Id. “A straightforward reading of the statute leads to the unremarkable conclusion that when Congress said all taxation, it meant all taxation.” Oakland Cnty., 716 F.3d at
940 (citing Lopez, 549 U.S. at 53). See also Sander v. Alexander Richardson Inv., 334 F.3d
712, 716 (8th Cir. 2003) (“In short, ‘all’ means all.”).
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However, one of the best rationales was the court’s explanation
of the missing “carve-out” in the federal exemption statute from the
transfer of deeds purchased by the Entities. The court expounded on
how Congress carved out from exemption the taxation of real property but failed to add a similar carve-out for real estate transfer taxes.80
“Accordingly, because the statutes are clear, we are not in a position
to second-guess Congress and create a new exception in the statute
for state and county real estate transfer taxes.”81
The court then analyzed two essential entity exemption cases—
the Supreme Court case Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck
Lumber Co.82 and a Sixth Circuit case United States v. State of Michigan83—“for the proposition that when Congress broadly exempts an
entity from ‘taxation’ or ‘all taxation’ it means all taxation.”84 In
Bismarck, the Court interpreted a statutory exclusion that exempted
“‘every Federal land bank . . . from . . . State, municipal, and local
taxation, except taxes upon real estate held, purchased, or taken by
said bank . . . .’”85 Similarly, the exclusion in Michigan exempted:
Federal credit unions . . . [,] their property, their franchises, capital, reserves, surpluses, and other funds,
and their income . . . from all taxation now or hereafter imposed by . . . any State, . . . or local taxing authority; except that any real property . . . shall be subject to . . . State, . . . and local taxation to the same extent as other similar property is taxed.86
The court reasoned that in both cases the statutory exemptions “precluded a sales tax on the entities’ purchases, even though sales taxes
were not a specifically enumerated exemption in the statute.”87
80.
Oakland Cnty., 716 F.3d at 940 (“When Congress provides exceptions in a
statute, it does not follow that courts have authority to create others. The proper inference . .
. is that Congress considered the issue of exceptions and, in the end, limited the statute to the
ones set forth.” (quoting United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58 (2000))).
81.
Id.at 941.
82.
Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95 (1941).
83.
United States v. Michigan, 851 F.2d 803 (6th Cir. 1988).
84.
Oakland Cnty., 716 F.3d at 941.
85.
Id. at 940-41 (quoting Bismarck, 314 U.S. at 96 n.1).
86.
Id. at 941 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Michigan, 851 F.2d at 805
n.1 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1768)).
87.
Id.
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In its holding, the Sixth Circuit explicitly rejected Oakland
County’s “arcane” argument that when Congress exempted the Entities from “all taxation,” they did not actually mean “all taxation;”
Congress merely used the “all taxation” phrase “as a term of art” that
did not include the transfer taxes in question.88 The plaintiffs, Oakland County et al., used the Wells Fargo line of reasoning which
holds that statutory exemptions from “all taxation” applies only to a
direct tax on the property itself, rather than an excise tax on the use
or transfer of the property.89 The court found this argument lacked
merit based on four specific reasons: (1) the Wells Fargo line of reasoning dealt with an exemption of the property—not an exemption of
a governmental entity; (2) plaintiffs failed to mention why the Wells
Fargo decision and its progeny should overrule the Bismarck line of
reasoning which holds that governmental instrumentalities cannot be
taxed by any state where the federal government has exempted that
instrumentality from taxation; (3) whether the Michigan taxes fall
directly on the Entities or on a privilege of transferring the property is
moot given that the plain language of the Michigan statute applies
directly to the Entities themselves; and (4) following the plaintiff’s
argument that “all taxation” means only “direct taxation” would lead
to an “absurd” result that undermines the previous rulings of the Supreme Court.90
VI. FANNIE AND FREDDIE ARE FEDERAL INSTRUMENTALITIES
When fashioning the Entities’ charters, Congress explicitly exempted Fannie and Freddie from having to qualify to do business in
any state91 and exempted Fannie and Freddie from all state taxation
(with the exception of real estate taxes).92 Congress made it clear that
Fannie and Freddie perform a significant governmental purpose by
stabilizing the secondary mortgage market,93 and that the federal
government has high awareness and concern in mortgage market as88.
Id. at 941-42.
89.
Oakland Cnty., 716 F.3d at 942. See infra Part VIII.A for a detailed analysis of
the Wells Fargo case and its progeny.
90.
Oakland Cnty., 716 F.3d at 943. See infra Part VII.B for a detailed analysis of
the Bismarck line of reasoning.
91.
Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Lefkowitz, 390 F. Supp. 1364, 1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(citing 12 U.S.C. § 1723a(a) (2006)).
92.
Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1723a(c)(1) (2006)).
93.
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716(1), 1719(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
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sistance,94 thereby showing that Congress has both explicitly and impliedly afforded federal instrumentality status to Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac.
There is nothing in the legislative history or in the statutes governing the operation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that supports
the conclusion that they are not government instrumentalities operating under the federal government. Congress clearly intended that
Freddie Mac would operate and be treated as a federal instrumentality. This intent is reflected throughout Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's
Charter Acts. For example, Congress provided that Fannie Mae shall
be immune from state and local taxation95 and shall have continuous
existence as an entity until dissolved by a separate act of Congress.96
Similarly, Congress further provided that Freddie Mac shall be immune from state and local taxes,97 shall be deemed a federal “agency” for purposes of bringing suit as a plaintiff,98 report annually and
directly to Congress,99 and have continuous existence as an entity
until dissolved by a separate act of Congress.100 These provisions
constitute conclusive signals that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are to
be treated as instrumentalities of the federal government.
It is no coincidence that Congress, when chartering Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, failed to explicitly mention that Fannie and Freddie
did not have the characteristics of federal instrumentalities. In fact,
over the years, Congress has established dozens of governmentsponsored corporations that had limiting text in their charters expressly exempting them from federal agency or instrumentality purposes.101 For example, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting’s
(CPC) charter states that CPC “will not be an agency or establish94.
See Lefkowitz, 390 F. Supp. at 1368.
95.
12 U.S.C. § 1723(a) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
96.
Id. § 1717.
97.
Id. § 1452(e).
98.
Id. § 1452(f).
99.
See id. § 1456(f).
100.
12 U.S.C. § 1452(c).
101.
See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 24301(a)(3) (2006) (chartering the National Railroad
Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), which “is not a department, agency or instrumentality of
the United States Government”); 42 U.S.C. § 3932(a) (2006) (chartering the National Housing Partnership Corporation, which “will not be an agency or establishment of the United
States Government”); 36 U.S.C. § 152401 (2006) (chartering the National Recording Preservation Foundation as a federal corporation, which “is not an agency or establishment of the
United States Government”); Id. § 152601 (2006) (chartering the Help America Vote Foundation, which “is not an agency or establishment of the United States Government”).
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ment of the United States Government.”102 Similarly, the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) charter provides that LSC “shall not be considered a department, agency or instrumentality, of the Federal Government.”103 Nowhere in Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac’s charter does
Congress explicitly state that the Entities “shall not be an instrumentality of the federal government.”104 If Congress intended the Entities
not to have the characteristics of, or be considered as, a federal instrumentality, Congress undoubtedly would have stipulated that sentiment in Fannie’s and Freddie’s charters.
Federal agencies have also consistently recognized Fannie’s and
Freddie’s designation as a federal instrumentality. The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO)—an agency created
exclusively by Congress to oversee Fannie and Freddie, which subsequently merged with the Federal Housing Finance Board to establish FHFA105—noted that “[t]he Enterprises are Federal instrumentalities [and were] established under Federal law to effect various broad
public policy purposes.”106 Additionally, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) has repeatedly acknowledged that Fannie and
Freddie are federal instrumentalities of the United States for purposes
of federal securities laws.107 The SEC affirmed its position even after
Fannie and Freddie voluntarily registered their common stock under
the Exchange Act, which required the Entities, for the first time, to
file periodic reports with the SEC.108 The SEC provided that the Entities’s “voluntary registration” would not affect their status as an
“agency, authority or instrumentality of the United States” with regards to federal securities laws, and that all “[s]ecurities issued or

102.
47 U.S.C. § 396(b) (2004).
103.
42 U.S.C. § 2996b(a) (1986); 42 U.S.C. § 2996d(e)(1) (1974).
104.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1723a(c)(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (Fannie Mae); 12 U.S.C. §
1452(e) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (Freddie Mac).
105.
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, ALLGOV (2013),
http://www.allgov.com/departments/department-of-housing-and-urban-developmenthud/office-of-federal-housing-enterprise-oversight?agencyid=7407.
106.
Rules of Practice and Procedure, 66 C.F.R. § 18040-01 (2001).
107.
See Fed. Home Loan Mort. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1971 WL 9616 (Sept.
18, 1971); Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 WL 234392 (May 25,
1988).
108.
See Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 1493134,
at *2-3 (Jul. 12, 2002); Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL
32165826, at *1-2 (Jul. 12, 2002).
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guaranteed by [the Entities] are exempt securities under the Securities Act of 1933.”109
Other federal entities such as the Congressional Budget Office
and Congressional Research Service have provided that Freddie Mac
is an instrumentality of the United States. The Congressional Budget
Office declared that government-sponsored enterprises, including
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are treated as federal instrumentalities,
as opposed to private corporations.110 Likewise, the Congressional
Research Service described Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as an “instrumentality of government” which it defined as a:
[P]rivately-owned institution not subject to any of the
general management laws and regulation unless so indicated in its enabling legislation (charter). An instrumentality is assigned in its charter limited prerogatives
(e.g., immunity from state taxation) normally associated with the government’s sovereign authority. . . .
[An instrumentality] is supervised but not directly
managed by the federal government.111
Contemporary cases have also treated Fannie and Freddie as
federal instrumentalities of the federal government.112 In Paslowski v.
Standard Mortgage Corporation of Georgia, plaintiffs filed a class
action suit against Freddie Mac alleging breach of contract, violations
of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection
109.
See Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 1493134,
at *2-3 (Jul. 12, 2002); Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL
32165826, at *1-2 (Jul. 12, 2002).
110.
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF REPEALING FANNIE MAE'S AND FREDDIE
MAC'S SEC EXEMPTIONS 1 (2003), available at http://www.cbo.gov/publication/14415.
111.
KEVIN R. KOSAR, THE QUASI GOVERNMENT: HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS WITH
BOTH GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR LEGAL CHARACTERISTICS 13 (2007).
112.
See, e.g., Mendrala v. Crown Mortg. Co., 955 F.2d 1132, 1140 (7th Cir. 1992)
(finding Freddie Mac is a federal instrumentality that is afforded Merrill doctrine protection); McCauley v. Thygerson, 732 F.2d 978, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[Freddie Mac] should
be considered a federal entity for purposes of deciding the proper scope of promissory estoppel.”); Rust v. Johnson, 597 F.2d 174 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding Fannie Mae is federal
instrumentality in regards to property interests in foreclosure cases); Deerman v. Fed. Home
Loan Mortg. Corp., 955 F. Supp. 1393, 1400 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (finding Freddie Mac is a
federal instrumentality that is afforded Merrill doctrine protection), aff'd, 140 F.3d 1043
(11th Cir. 1998); Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass'n v. Lefkowitz, 390 F. Supp. 1364, 1368 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (noting that there is “little doubt that Congress intended [Fannie Mae] to be recognized as a federal instrumentality”).
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Law, and breach of fiduciary duty regarding administration of plaintiffs' mortgage loan agreements.113 Freddie had purchased plaintiffs’
mortgages but allowed third parties, so-called “servicers,” to control
the operation of the mortgages.114 The court found that Freddie Mac
“is a federal instrumentality that is entitled to protection . . . from
liability for the unauthorized acts of its sellers/servicers” under the
ostensible Merrill doctrine.115 The court further held that when agents
of Freddie Mac are accused of misrepresentations beyond the scope
of their authority, Freddie “cannot be estopped or bound by the unauthorized acts or conduct of its agents.”116
Furthermore, a survey of the cases involving the Federal Land
Banks and the Federal Home Loan banks reveals that, just as the
banks are treated as federal instrumentalities,117 Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac are also treated as federal instrumentalities engaged in
the performance of governmental functions even though their stock
may be privately owned.118 In Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v.
Priddy, the Supreme Court affirmed its previous rulings that federal
land banks “are instrumentalities of the federal government, engaged
in the performance of an important governmental function.”119 The
Court’s reasoning was partially based on the fact that the land banks
“partake of the sovereign character of the United States” and the fact
that Congress has the authority to “determine the extent to which
they may be subjected to suit and judicial process.”120
In Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., the
Supreme Court affirmed the holding in Priddy that the federal land

113.
Paslowski v. Standard Mortg. Corp. of Ga., 129 F. Supp. 2d 793, 795-98 (W.D.
Pa. 2000).
114.
Id.
115.
Id. at 801. The Merrill doctrine provides that the federal “government cannot be
estopped or bound by the unauthorized acts or conduct of its agents or its employees has
been widely applied in a variety of contexts.” See id. at 800.
116.
Id.
117.
Fed. Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U.S. 229, 231 (1935); Fed. Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 101-04 (1941); Fahey v. O'Melveny & Myers, 200 F.2d
420, 446, 454 (9th Cir. 1952); Willhoit v. Fahey, 345 U.S. 952 (1953); 12 U.S.C. §§ 692,
1426 (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
118.
Priddy, 295 U.S. at 231 (emphasis added); Rust v. Johnson, 597 F.2d 174, 178
(1979).
119.
Priddy, 295 U.S. at 231 (citing Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255
U.S. 180 (1921)); Fed. Land Bank v. Gaines, 290 U.S. 247 (1933).
120.
Priddy, 295 U.S. at 231.
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banks are “instrumentalities of the federal government.”121 The Court
further opined that Congress has the authority to insulate and shield
instrumentalities that it has constitutionally established,122 a “conclusion [that] follows naturally from the express grant of power to Congress ‘to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution all powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States.’”123
Supreme Court precedent further establishes that in order for
Congress to create a constitutionally valid corporation, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the corporation must be a federal instrumentality established to carry out governmental functions.124 In
M'Culloch v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that Congress has
the authority to create federal corporations.125 M’Culloch also provided that Congress’s power is limited to creating corporations,
which will serve as “instruments,” executing the authority of the federal government.126 The Court in Federal Land Bank of Wichita v.
Board of County Commissioners ruled that a corporation created by
Congress, owned by private shareholders, and which may incur a
profit or loss on their shares is still a federal instrumentality constitutionally created to execute governmental functions.127 Consequently,
if Congress wished to remain in accordance with its constitutionally
granted powers, it may only establish a corporation that is an instru121.
Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 102 (1941)
(quoting Priddy, 295 U.S. at 231).
122.
Id.
123.
Id. at 102-03 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18).
124.
See Luxton v. N. River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 529 (1894) (“Congress . . .
may create corporations . . . executing the powers of [the federal] government.”); Bismarck ,
314 U.S. at 102 (“It . . . follows that when Congress constitutionally creates a corporation
through which the federal government lawfully acts, the activities of such corporation are
governmental.”) (citations omitted); Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 383 (finding the operations of a federal corporation is always governmental, “not partly public or
partly private . . .”); Fed. Land Bank of Wichita v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 368 U.S. 146,
150-51 (1961) (“[T]he Federal Government performs no ‘proprietary’ functions. If the enabling Act is constitutional and if the instrumentality's activity is within the authority granted
by the Act, a governmental function is being performed.”).
125.
See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
126.
Id. at 420. See also Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 860 (1824) (“It has
never been supposed that congress could create . . . [a private] corporation . . . . [T]he case of
McCulloch v. Maryland, is founded on . . . the idea that the [corporate] bank is an instrument
which ‘is necessary and proper for carrying into effect the powers vested in the government
of the United States.’”).
127.
See Fed. Land Bank of Wichita, 368 U.S. at 150-51.
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mentality of the United States. As such, because Fannie and Freddie
were created by Congress to serve the public in creating affordable
mortgages, a legitimate government function, Fannie and Freddie are
both instrumentalities of the federal government.
VII. LEGAL INTUITIVENESS: STATES CANNOT TAX THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT
The crux of this Comment rests on the proposition that state
governments cannot tax the federal government. I have coined this
argument “legal intuitiveness” because people who have knowledge
of the Federal Constitution and how it relates to the states, through
either the Fourteenth Amendment or case precedent, intuitively know
that states cannot tax the federal government. As laid out previously,
Congress exempted Fannie, Freddie, and FHFA from “all taxation”
levied by states, counties, or municipalities.128 Moreover, since Fannie and Freddie are federal instrumentalities that act under the authority of the federal government,129 states that attempt to collect transfer
taxes following the purchase of real property are usurping well established precedent that holds states cannot tax the federal government.130
A.

M’CULLOCH AND OSBORN

The cornerstone assertion in this Comment is that states cannot
tax federal instrumentalities. The famous case of M’Culloch v. Maryland concerned several states that attempted to tax federal banks.131
Congress had chartered the Second Bank of the United States, establishing branches in multiple states, including one in Baltimore, Maryland.132 The Maryland legislature then adopted an Act that imposed a
tax on all banks in the state not chartered by the state legislature.133
128.
See supra Part III.
129.
See supra Part VI.
130.
See Mich. Nat’l Bank v. Michigan, 365 U.S. 467 (1961); Des Moines Bank v.
Fairweather, 263 U.S. 103 (1923); First Nat’l Bank v. Adams, 258 U.S. 362 (1922); Owensboro Nat’l Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664 (1899); Weston v. City Council of Charleston,
27 U.S. 449 (1829); Osborn v. U.S. Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); M’Culloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
131.
M’Culloch, 17 U.S. 316.
132.
Id. at 317.
133.
Id. at 317-18.
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James McCulloch, a cashier for the Baltimore branch of the Second
Bank, was sued by Maryland for violating this Act after he admitted
he was not complying with the Maryland law.134 After losing two
state appeals, McCulloch appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.135
The Supreme Court held that, under the Necessary and Proper
Clause of the Constitution, Congress is permitted to create a Bank of
the United States, and because the Constitution is supreme over state
laws, the states cannot levy taxes against the banks.136
Following the M’Culloch decision, the Supreme Court once
again encountered the question of whether a state could tax a federal
bank.137 In 1819, the Ohio legislature passed a law labeled as “an act
to levy and collect a tax from all banks, and individuals, and companies and associations of individuals, that may transact banking business in this state, without being allowed to do so by the laws thereof.”138 Ralph Osborn, Auditor of the State of Ohio, ordered the collection of $100,000 from a United States Bank in accordance with the
Ohio Tax Act.139 Osborn argued that it was “contended, that, admitting congress to possess the power [to exempt United States’ Banks
from taxation], this exemption ought to have been expressly asserted
in the act of incorporation; and, not being expressed, ought not to be
implied by the court.”140 Justice Marshall countered by stating, “[i]t
is no unusual thing, for an act of congress to imply . . . this very exemption from state control . . . .”141
Osborn also attempted to distinguish between
the bank and the public institutions, such as the mint
or the post office. The agents in those offices are . . .
officers of government. . . . Not so the directors of the
bank. The connection of the government with the bank
is likened to that with contractors.142
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 318-19.
Id. at 320.
M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 324-26.
Osborn v. U.S. Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
Id. at 740 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 742.
Id. at 865.
Id.
Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 866.
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Justice Marshall agreed with the analogy but held that the Bank
(United States contractor) was exempt from taxation because it was
acting under the guise of the United States government.143 Justice
Marshall further held that “property of the contractor may be taxed,
as the property of other citizens . . . [b]ut we do not admit that the act
of purchasing, or of conveying the articles purchased, can be under
State control.”144 The holding in Osborn not only reaffirmed
M’Culloch, but also expanded the argument that instrumentalities of
the federal government are exempt from state taxation.
B.

CASES THAT HAVE EXPANDED M’CULLOCH AND OSBORN

The first major case to reaffirm and expand M’Culloch and Osborn concerned a South Carolina ordinance that imposed taxation on
“bonds, notes . . . or other obligations” of the United States.145 In
Weston v. City Council of Charleston, the Court held that “states
have no power, by taxation, or otherwise, to retard, impede, burthen,
or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws
enacted by congress, to carry into execution the powers vested in the
general government.”146 The Court further held: “[t]he sovereignty of
a state extends to everything which exists by its own authority, or is
introduced by its permission; but not to those means which are employed by congress [sic] to carry into execution powers conferred on
that body by the people of the United States.”147
Fiscal institutions chartered by Congress, their shares, and their
property, are taxable only with the consent of Congress and only in
conformity with the restrictions it has attached to its consent.148 Like
Fannie and Freddie, national banks are privately run federal instrumentalities, chartered by Congress, with specific goals of “mak[ing]
investments directly or indirectly, each of which promotes the public
143.
Id. at 867.
144.
Id.
145.
Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 27 U.S. 449 (1829).
146.
Id. at 467 (quoting M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 317 (1819)) (internal
quotations omitted).
147.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 429) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
148.
See, e.g., Mich. Nat’l Bank v. Michigan, 365 U.S. 467 (1961); Des Moines
Bank v. Fairweather, 263 U.S. 103, 106 (1923); First Nat’l Bank v. Adams, 258 U.S. 362
(1922); Owensboro Nat’l Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664, 669 (1899).
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welfare by benefiting primarily low- and moderate-income communities or families (such as by providing housing, services, or jobs).”149
National banks, “[u]pon duly making and filing articles of association
. . . shall become, as from the date of the execution of its organization
certificate, a body corporate” of the United States.150 Akin to national
banks, federal land banks are chartered by Congress as a body corporate of the United States.
As previously discussed, federal land banks are instrumentalities
of the federal government, “engaged in the performance of an important governmental function.”151 In Pittman v. Home Owners’ Loan
Corp., M. Luther Pittman, Clerk of the Superior Court of Baltimore
City, refused to record a mortgage purchased by the Home Owners’
Loan Corporation.152 Similar to the state transfer tax statutes, a Maryland statute “impose[d] a tax upon every mortgage, recorded or offered for record, at the rate of 10 cents for each $100, or fraction
thereof, of the principal amount of the debt secured by the mortgage.”153 Like the federal statutes exempting Fannie and Freddie,
Congress, through the Home Owners’ Loan Act, provided that “the
Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, its franchise, capital, reserves and
surplus, and its loans and income shall be exempt from all state or
municipal taxes.”154 The Court found the federal statute controlling,
reasoning that Congress has both the “power to create a corporation
to facilitate the performance of governmental functions” and the
power to protect the operations of that corporation.155 The Court relied on M’Culloch for the proposition that, under the Necessary and
Proper Clause of the Constitution,156 “[a] power to create implies a
power to preserve.”157
The Supreme Court held that a similar excise tax was unconstitutional when applied to Federal Land Banks by states. In Federal
149.
12 U.S.C. § 24 (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
150.
Id.
151.
Fed. Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U.S. 229, 231 (1935).
152.
Pittman v. Home Owners’ Loan Corp. of Washington, D.C., 308 U.S. 21, 29
(1939).
153.
Id. (citing Acts of 1937, Ex. Sess., Chap. 11, Code of Maryland, Art. 81, sec.
213).
154.
Id. at 31.
155.
Pittman, 308 U.S. at 32-33.
156.
Id. at 33 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18).
157.
Id. (quoting M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 426 (1819)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., North Dakota tried to impose a
retail sales tax on a sale of lumber and other building materials to the
bank for use in repairing and improving property that had been acquired by foreclosure or mortgages.158 North Dakota argued:
Congress has authority to extend immunity only to the
governmental functions of the federal land banks; the
only governmental functions of the land banks are
those performed by acting as depositaries and fiscal
agents for the federal government . . . all other functions of the land banks are private; [the Federal Land
Bank] here was engaged in an activity incidental to its
business of lending money, an essentially private
function; therefore [federal tax exemptions] cannot
operate to strike down a sales tax upon purchases
made in furtherance of petitioner’s lending functions.159
The Court held that the federal statute exempting “every Federal
land bank . . . from Federal, State, municipal, and local taxation”160
applied to the North Dakota sales tax on all gross receipts from sales
of material personalty,161 and, therefore, the Federal Land Bank in
question was not liable for the enforced sales tax.162 The Court’s reasoning stemmed from the fact that “[t]he federal government is one
of delegated powers, and from that it necessarily follows that any
constitutional exercise of its delegated powers is governmental.”163
The Court further held, “when Congress constitutionally creates a

158.
Fed. Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 98 (1941) (emphasis
added). The Federal Land Bank of St. Paul was created pursuant to the Federal Farm Loan
Act of July 17, 1916, ch. 245, 39 Stat. 360, 380, and was subject to the Sales Tax Act of
North Dakota, North Dakota Laws of 1937, ch. 249. Id.
159.
Bismarck, 314 U.S. at 101.
160. Federal Farm Loan Act, ch. 245, 39 Stat. 360 (1916) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 931).
161.
Bismarck, 314 U.S. at 99 (construing 1937 N.D. Laws ch. 249, § 2 (amended at
1937 N.D. Laws §§ 3(a), 6, 7)).
162.
Bismarck, 314 U.S. at 100.
163.
Id. at 102 (citing Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 477
(1939)).
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corporation through which the federal government lawfully acts, the
activities of such corporation are governmental.”164
C.

THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE FORBIDS STATES FROM TAXING
FANNIE AND FREDDIE

It is also intuitive that, through the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution, federal law trumps state law when the federal government regulates the area in question. The Supremacy Clause contained
in the United States Constitution states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.165
When interpreting the Supremacy Clause, the Supreme Court
has held that “[i]t lies within Congressional power to authorize regulation, including taxation, by the state of federal instrumentalities,”
and “Congress may protect its agencies from the burdens of local
taxation.”166 The Supreme Court has extended its inclusion of federal
exemptions over taxation by expressing that a state tax can be found
repugnant to the Constitution or federal law even if the tax “does not

164.
Id. (citing Pittman v. Home Owners’ Loan Corp., 308 U.S. 21, 32 (1939);
Graves, 306 U.S at 477).
165.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
166.
E.g., Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 446 (1943) (emphasis added). Mayo
concerned an action by the United States against certain Florida officials for the enforcement
of a state inspection fee of fertilizer that was purchased out of state for use by Florida farmers. Id. at 442. The Court explicitly provided that the government of the United States is of
“delegated powers,” which cannot be trumped by any one state. Id. at 445. This is true even
where the Constitution or any federal statute is void of language exempting the government
or its instrumentalities from regulation or taxation by the states. See id. at 445-46. Contra
Graves, 306 U.S. at 595 (finding that a matter of local concern within the scope of the federal government did not violate the Supremacy Clause because an extension of immunity by a
federal instrumentality does not extend to an employee claiming an imposition of income tax
was a burden on the federal government).
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fall directly on the United States if [the tax] operates so as to discriminate against the Government or those with whom it deals.”167
Even Illinois, whose counties filed suit against the Entities and
FHFA,168 has found the Supremacy Clause applicable against state
taxation because the Supremacy Clause prohibits state intrusion on
areas policed by Congress.169 In United States v. Hynes, the United
States sought declaratory judgment that Cook County was prohibited
from administering ad valorem property taxes on two federal buildings being acquired by a federal entity.170 The federal statute allowed
any state to tax an interest in real property until title was passed to the
government of the United States.171 The recently amended Illinois
statute172 provided that any real property acquired by the federal government or an instrumentality thereof, under an installment contract,
to be exempt, except property that the federal government has permitted to be taxed.173 In granting judgment for the United States, the
court, among other things, ruled the tax to be discriminatory and in167.
United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 473 (1958) (citing M’Culloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 317 (1819)). In City of Detroit, the United States brought an action
against Michigan to recover taxes paid on property owned by the federal government but
leased to a private business party. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. at 467. The Court affirmed the
Michigan Supreme Court decision in favor of the State. Id. at 475. The Court reasoned that
because the Michigan tax on real property applied to every private business, and because the
United States does business with a variety of private businesses, the State should not be
deprived of the benefit of property tax. See id. at 473-75. However, the Court did state that a
tax immunity in situations such as this could be promulgated by Congress. Id. at 474. In his
dissent, Justice Whittaker indirectly tiptoed on a Supremacy Clause argument by concluding
that the state “statute imposes the tax on the Government's property interest, which is immune from state taxation,” and thus the tax should be found repugnant to the Constitution.
See id. at 483 (Whittaker, J., dissenting). Justice Whittaker found the federal exemption
applicable, because the State was taxing the private business at the full rate of the assessed
property, not for the value of the lease, and thus was imposing a tax on a federally immune
instrumentality. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. at 483 (Whittaker, J., dissenting).
168.
Complaint, Dekalb Cnty. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 2012 WL 2609755
(N.D.Ill. 2012) (No. 3:12CV50227).
169.
United States v. Hynes, 759 F. Supp. 1303 (1991). See Katz v. Westlawn Cemetery Ass’n, 285 Ill. App. 3d 695 (1st Dist. 1996).
170.
Hynes, 759 F. Supp at 1304.
171.
Id. at 1305 (citing 40 U.S.C. § 602a(d)).
172.
This case was decided previously in a decision in which the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s finding that two buildings owned by the federal
government were exempt from local taxation. United States v. Cook Cnty., 725 F.2d 1128
(7th Cir. 1984). In its reasoning, the court saw the tax as discriminatory because Illinois was
attempting to tax the federal government while exempting itself from the same taxation. Id.
at 1131.
173.
Hynes, 759 F. Supp. at 1305 (quoting Illinois Revised Statutes ch. 120, ¶
500.9a).
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consistent with the Supremacy Clause because “the state has . . .
treat[ed] themselves better than it treat[ed] the federal government,”174 and that this type of taxation has been forbidden since
M’Culloch v. Maryland.175
As such, the federal statutes exempting the Entities and FHFA
from “all taxation” are laws of the United States, which are the supreme law of the land. Accordingly, through the Supremacy Clause,
the federal statutes prevent any state law claim regarding transfer tax
liability.
D.

THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTES EXEMPTS THE
ENTITIES FROM STATE TAXATION

When interpreting a statute, it is well established that courts
must initiate their analysis on the express language of the statute itself.176 “When the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the
courts . . . is to enforce it according to its terms.”177 Furthermore, it is

174.
Id. at 1307. The court reasoned, “[b]y taking advantage of this situation, the
Illinois legislature was imposing a tax on property being acquired by the federal government
under an installment contract but not on property similarly situated yet being acquired by the
state.” Id.
175.
Id. (citing M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 436 (1819)).
176.
E.g., Burlington N. R. Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987)
(quoting United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606 (1986)); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 56 (1987); Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v.
GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). See also U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Clark, 216 Ill.
2d 334, 346 (2005) (holding when “construing a statute, the most fundamental rule is to give
effect to the legislature's intent, and the best evidence of that intent is the statutory language”
that “must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. . . . If the statutory language is clear, we
must give effect to its plain and ordinary meaning. . . .”); Katz v. Dep’t of Liquor Control of
Ohio, 166 Ohio St. 229, 231 (1957) (holding that “[i]t is too well established to require citation of authority that we look primarily for the intention of the Legislature as it is expressed
in the enactment language which it adopted. Where the language itself clearly expresses the
legislative intent, the courts need look no further”); North Carolina ex rel. Pender Cnty.
Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Parker, 319 N.C. 354, 358 (1987) (holding “[t]he
starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly
expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as
conclusive”). State court decisions were included to show that some of the states that are
making transfer tax claims have solid common law footing in their own states that give
deference to the legislature of the United States when the plain language of the statute clearly expresses Congress’s intent to exempt the Entities and FHFA from tax liability.
177.
Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005) (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1 (2000)).
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a maxim of statutory construction that, unless otherwise defined,
words should be given their ordinary, common meaning.178
As of February 2013, the most recent decision concerning this
argument was Hertel v. Bank of America N.A., in which a Register of
Deeds for a Michigan county brought suit against Fannie, Freddie
and other defendants for unpaid transfer taxes.179 The district court
explained the “first step in interpreting a statute is to determine
whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning
with regard to the particular dispute in the case. [The court’s] inquiry
must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and ‘the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.’”180 Fannie and Freddie argued
that the exemption statues are unambiguous, as “all taxation” means
exactly that, “all taxation.”181 They further argued that if the court
interprets the exemption statutes as not exempting transfer taxes, then
“the Court would have to rewrite ‘all taxation’ as ‘some taxation, but
not recording taxes.’”182 The court agreed and saw the exemption
statutes as unambiguous. In its reasoning the court explained, “‘[a]ll’
is an inclusive adjective that does not leave room for unmentioned
exceptions. Indeed, the fact that one exception [the real property tax
exception] is explicitly included further supports this conclusion.”183
The language in the federal exemption statutes is clear and unambiguous. The statutes are materially identical.184 Congress clearly
and plainly provided the Entities and FHFA “shall be exempt from
all taxation now and hereafter imposed by any State . . . county, mu-

178.
See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (1979).
179.
Hertel v. Bank of Am. N.A., 897 F. Supp. 2d 579, 580 (W.D. Mich. 2012).
180.
Id. at 582 (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)) (quoting
United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)).
181.
Id.
182.
Id.
183.
Id. The District Court for the Western District of Michigan further reasoned,
“[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative
intent.” Hertel, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 582 (quoting Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608,
616-17 (1980)). “Consequently, the Court finds that the text unambiguously exempts the
Enterprise Defendants from all state taxation, with the sole exception of taxes on real property.” Id.The court further held that the exemption statutes were coherent and consistent with
another federal tax exemption statute (12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(4)) that applied to “any person,”
rather than “the agency” itself, because § 4617(j)(4) and the exemption statutes were not
“mutually exclusive,” and thus the exemption statutes were not surplus. Id. at 582-83.
184.
See supra Part III.
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nicipality, or local taxing authority.”185 The transfer tax that states are
attempting to recover is unquestionably a tax imposed on the Entities
and FHFA by a local taxing authority. “That should be the end of the
matter,”186 because the statutes are clear that “all” states, counties,
and municipalities are not able to obtain any tax, albeit property taxes, from the Entities and FHFA because Congress clearly exempted
them from taxes such as these.187 Had Congress intended “all taxation” to exclude transfer taxes, the legislature would have expressly
mentioned that exclusion in the plain language of the statutes. As
such, courts have no other option than to interpret the statutes at face
value and enforce the exemptions from state imposed transfer taxes.
VIII. “ALL TAXATION” INCLUDES EXCISE TAXES, AS WELL AS
DIRECT TAXES
The Supreme Court has consistently held that statutes prohibiting documentary stamp taxes188 on federal instrumentalities from
state, county, or local taxation—statutes similar to the Corporations’
Exemption Statutes—do in fact exempt federal instrumentalities from
state taxation.189 Moreover, the fact that Congress has expressly exempted Fannie, Freddie, and FHFA from “all [state and local] taxation,” with a narrow exception for taxes on real property,190 gives
more weight to the conclusion that Fannie, Freddie, and FHFA are
exempt from state transfer tax.
A.

“ALL TAXATION” CASES

A common argument put forth by states is that Fannie and Freddie are not exempt from transfer taxes because the federal exemption
185.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1723a(c)(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (Fannie Mae); 12 U.S.C. §
1452(e) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (Freddie Mac); 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(2) (2006 & Supp. II
2008) (FHFA) (emphasis added).
186.
Hager v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 882 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112 (D.D.C. 2012)
(quoting Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 409 (1993)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
187.
See Hager, 882 F.Supp. 2d at 112-13.
188.
A documentary stamp tax “is a tax on documents, instruments, loan agreements
and papers evidencing the acceptance, assignment, sale or transfer of an obligation, right or
property incident thereto.” Documentary Stamp Tax, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
http://www.bir.gov.ph/taxinfo/tax_docstm.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
189.
Pittman v. Home Owners’ Loan Corp., 308 U.S. 21 (1939).
190.
See supra Part III.
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from “all taxation” includes only direct taxes, not excise taxes.191
United States v. Wells Fargo is a decisive case supporting this argument.192 In Wells Fargo, the Supreme Court held that “Project Notes”
held by state and federal housing agencies could be subject to excise
taxation, such as an estate tax, by the federal government even
though a federal statute exempted the project notes from taxation.193
In contrast, Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber held
that federal instrumentalities are exempt from paying an excise tax
under a federal statute immunizing the instrumentality from federal,
state, and local taxation.194 Moreover, Gurley v. Rhoden provides that
even if prompted by an underlying transaction, an excise tax is imposed on the individual entity itself, not the transaction.195
The more recent case of Hager v. Federal National Mortgage
Association dealt with Fannie, Freddie, and FHFA’s refusal to pay
transfer tax on the recordation of deeds.196 The court in Hager took
an opposing view to the Wells Fargo decision.197 The court reasoned
that unlike the Wells Fargo decision, which focused on a statutory
exemption for property, the Bismarck decision focused on an exemp191.
See, e.g., Oakland Cnty. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 871 F. Supp. 2d 662, 667
(E.D. Mich. 2012). Direct taxes are taxes “imposed on property, as distinguished from a tax
on a right or privilege,” whereas an excise tax is a “tax imposed on the manufacture, sale, or
use of goods.” BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 646 (9th ed. 2009).
192.
United States v. Wells Fargo, 485 U.S. 351 (1988). The Wells Fargo case was
an appeal by the United States against a ruling from the United States District Court for the
Central District of California that exempted federal housing agency obligations from federal
estate taxes. Id. at 353. Pursuant to the Housing Act of 1937, obligations owed by certain
state and federal public agency housing entities, commonly referred to as “Project Notes,”
were exempt from “all taxation” imposed by the United States. The Project Notes were used
by the agencies to finance housing projects. Id. Congress provided that the Project Notes,
not the actual entities themselves, were exempt from the federal estate tax. See id.
193.
Id. at 356 (emphasis added). In its holding, the Court commented that if Congress had intended to exempt the Project Notes from the estate tax, it would have expressly
provided an “estate tax” exemption in the statute. Wells Fargo, 495 U.S. at 356.
194.
Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 99-100
(1941). In Bismarck, the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul brought action against Bismarck
Lumber Co. and the North Dakota State Tax Commissioner for an enforced sales tax on the
sale of lumber required for improvements. Id. at 98. The applicable federal statutory exemption provided “[t]hat every Federal land bank shall be exempt from Federal, State, municipal, and local taxation . . . .” Id. at 99 (quoting the Federal Farm Loan Act, ch. 245, § 26, 39
Stat. 360, 380) (internal quotation marks omitted).
195.
See, e.g., Gurley v. Rhoden, 421 U.S. 200, 208 (1975).
196.
Hager v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n., 882 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2012). See
supra Part V.
197.
See Hager, 882 F. Supp. 2d at 112-13.
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tion that applied to the entity itself.198 The statutes concerning Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac “exempt an entity from all taxation. A recordation tax for a deed on one of the Entities’ records is indisputably
a tax on that entity. It thus falls within the statutory exemption.”199
For example:
[I]f the statute had provided that “Fannie Mae’s real
property shall be exempt from all taxation,” Fannie
Mae would still be liable for the recordation tax because it is a tax on the real property’s transfer rather
than on the real property. But because the statute instead exempts Fannie Mae itself, neither its property
nor its activities can be taxed.200
The court further distinguished Wells Fargo on the fact that the
decision failed to “mandate an atextual reading of ‘all taxation.’”201
Rather, Wells Fargo concerned limitations on taxation of the entities’
property, not the owner of the entities’ property.202 Shortly following
Hager, another Michigan District Court case, this time from the
Western District,203 agreed with the District Court for the District of
Columbia and reaffirmed that Wells Fargo was misconstrued.204 The
court in Hertel v. Bank of America N.A. held that although the Wells
Fargo decision provides that, in limited circumstances, a statutory
exemption from “all taxation” concerning property might not include
excise taxation, concluding that the decision applies to a statutory
exemption from “all taxation” concerning the entity itself is misguided.205 The court in Hertel expressly stated that the Wells Fargo deci198.
Id.
199.
Id. at 112.
200.
Id. at 111 (internal quotation marks omitted).
201.
Id. at 112.
202.
Hager, 882 F. Supp. 2d at 112.
203.
This case was from the Western District of Michigan, as opposed to the District
Court for Eastern District of Michigan, which handed down the Oakland County decision.
See supra Part V.A.
204.
Hertel v. Bank of Am. N.A., 897 F. Supp. 2d 579 (W.D. Mich. 2012). See also
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellants at *15, Cnty. of
Oakland v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 2012 WL 5817171 (6th Cir. 2012) (Nos. 12-2135, 122136). This appellate brief was filed by the Department of Justice as amicus curiae in support of the appellants—FHFA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac—following notice of appeal of
the Oakland County decision to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
205.
Hertel, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 584-85.
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sion and its progeny did not contain any language applying to a tax
exemption for an entity.206 One of the clearest articulations of the
distinction between a property and entity tax exemption was provided
by the Hertel court:
In Wells Fargo, “all taxation” in the housing statute
still meant all taxation even after the court's decision.
The promissory notes remained exempt from the estate tax, even though the estate tax was required to be
paid. The reason “all taxation” was still able to retain
its meaning is because the estate tax never purported
to tax the promissory notes. The estate tax . . . was a
tax on the transfer of property, not the property itself.
And because the statute specified an exemption only
for the property and not its owner or its transfer, the
exemption was never triggered even though it was the
owner of the promissory notes who was liable for the
tax.207
The federal statutes exempting the Entities and FHFA offer
broad exemptions from state and local taxation.208 The tax on the
transfer and recordation of the deeds can be construed as a tax on the
transfer itself.209 However, the tax of the transfer of property must be
paid by the entity and is thus a tax on the property itself.210 “To say
that a transfer tax only taxes an entity’s transfer is equivalent to saying that the income tax only taxes an entity’s income,”211 as opposed
to the entity itself.
Likewise, the statutes exempting Fannie, Freddie, and FHFA exempt the entities themselves, not the property or the holdings of the
entities.212 Unlike the Wells Fargo and Oakland County decisions,
the term “all taxation,” when used in a statute exempting an entity

206.
Id. at 584.
207.
Id.
208.
See supra Part III.
209.
See supra Part IV.
210.
See Hertel, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 585-86.
211.
Id. at 585.
212.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1723a(c)(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (Fannie Mae); 12 U.S.C. §
1452(e) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (Freddie Mac); 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(2) (2006 & Supp. II
2008) (FHFA) (emphasis added).
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itself, includes both direct and excise taxes.213 Therefore, the statutes
exempting the entities and FHFA from “all taxation” by states, counties, and municipalities apply to both direct and excise taxes such as
the transfer tax.214
IX. EVEN IF FANNIE AND FREDDIE ARE NOT DEEMED FEDERAL
INSTRUMENTALITIES, THEY ARE EXEMPT UNDER THE
CONSERVATORSHIP OF FHFA
Even if Fannie and Freddie are not deemed federal instrumentalities, this Comment argues that they are (or should be) exempt under the conservatorship of the FHFA. This argument is saved for last
because, depending on how this argument is viewed, it could be a last
resort. For instance, the courts could find the exemptions valid if they
were to accept that Fannie and Freddie are government entities,215
under conservatorship of the FHFA, and are exempted under federal
statute from paying transfer tax because states cannot tax federal instrumentalities216 where Congress has provided an unambiguous tax
exemption.217 On the other hand, however, courts could find that
Fannie and Freddie are private corporations, not government instrumentalities, and are thus not immune from state transfer tax liability.
If the latter occurs, this argument could be pushed to the front of the
line, rather than be an afterthought argument. Furthermore, while
important, this argument could lend itself short-lived if Fannie and
Freddie emerge from conservatorship and regain their status as independent instrumentalities of the federal government. In any instance,
as a named federal agency, and because Congress explicitly provided
a taxation exemption to the FHFA when acting as a conservator,
Fannie, Freddie, and FHFA are exempt from state transfer taxes.218
As conservator of Fannie and Freddie, “FHFA is charged with
taking any action necessary to put the regulated entity in a sound and
solvent condition and any action appropriate to carry on the business
213.
Contra Fahey v. O'Melveny & Myers, 200 F.2d 420, 446, 454 (9th Cir. 1952);
Willhoit v. Fahey, 345 U.S. 952 (1953); Fed. Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S.
95, 101-04 (1941); Fed. Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U.S. 229, 231 (1935).
214.
See id.
215.
See supra Part VI.
216.
See supra Part VII.A, B.
217.
See supra Part VII.D.
218.
See 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(1)-(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).

124

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 34

of the regulated entity and preserve and conserve the assets and property of the regulated entity.”219 In Nevada ex rel. Hager v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, the court concluded that Fannie Mae
was exempt from transfer tax liability due to FHFA’s conservator
status.220 The court looked at FHFA’s broad control over Fannie’s
assets and operations and the fact that Congress explicitly provided
FHFA tax exemption from any state or local imposed tax.221 Another
federal district court echoed this sentiment, holding that, as conservator of Fannie and Freddie, FHFA is exempt from taxation because
Congress expressly provided a taxation exemption to FHFA.222
X. CONCLUSION
As advanced in this Comment, it is well established that Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac are government instrumentalities.223 The exemption statutes Congress enacted provide broad exemptions from
state taxation for Fannie, Freddie, and FHFA.224 These exemptions
219.
Nevada ex rel. Hager v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP, 812 F. Supp.
2d 1211, 1217 (D. Nev. 2011) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(D)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
220.
Nevada ex rel. Hager v. Countryside Home Loans Servicing, LP, 812 F. Supp.
2d at 1218. Although holding that Fannie Mae was exempt under FHFA’s control, the court
also held that Fannie Mae is not a federal instrumentality for tax purposes because Fannie
Mae is not “interdependent” on the federal government “as to make Fannie Mae’s actions
the actions of the federal government.” Id. The court reasoned, “Fannie Mae does not act as
a virtual arm of the federal government because it operates as a for-profit entity owned by its
private shareholders.” Id. at 1217.
221.
Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(A), (B), (J) (FHFA’s conservatorship over
Fannie Mae); 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(1)-(2) (FHFA’s Tax Exemption statute)). See also, e.g.,
Leon Cnty. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 816 F. Supp 2d 1205 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (stating that
FHFA “is a federal agency that has duties both as a regulator, and . . . as the conservator” of
Fannie and Freddie); Williams v. Geithner, No. 09–1959 ADM/JJG, 2009 WL 3757380, at
*3 (D. Minn. Nov. 9, 2009) (“FHFA is a federal agency that supervises and regulates housing finance and also serves as the Conservator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.”); In re
Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. Derivative Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 790, 792 (E.D. Va. 2009)
(stating that FHFA is “the federal agency acting as conservator of Freddie Mac pursuant to
the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 . . . .”).
222.
Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. Royal Bank of Scotland Group, No. 3:11-CV-01383
(AWT), 2012 WL 3580522, at *2 (D. Conn. Aug. 17, 2012) (quoting Nevada v. Countrywide Home Loan Servicing, LP, No. 3:10–cv–419–RCJ–PAL, 2011 WL 4356507, at *5 (D.
Nev. Sept. 16, 2011) (“[N]o court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of
powers or functions of the Agency as a conservator or a receiver.” (quoting 12 U.S.C. §
4617(f))).
223.
See supra Part VI.
224.
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1452(e), 1723a(c)(2), 4617(j)(2) (emphasis added).
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explicitly prohibit state imposed transfer taxes on the Entities. The
statutes provide that Fannie, Freddie, and FHFA “shall be exempt
from all taxation” imposed by states, counties, and local taxing authorities, with a narrow exception for real property taxes that are not
at issue in this Comment.225
Determining that states can impose a transfer tax on the Entities
and FHFA contradicts years of Supreme Court decisions and interpretations, undermines the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,
and undercuts the authority of Congress. M’Culloch v. Maryland established that states cannot tax the federal government or instrumentalities of the government.226 This cornerstone of law was reaffirmed
in Osborn v. United States Bank, where Justice Marshall stated that
the Bank of the United States was exempt from state taxation because
it was acting under the guise of the federal government.227 Subsequent cases expanded this notion by holding that “states have no
power by taxation, or otherwise, to retard, impede, burthen, or in any
manner control the operation of the constitutional laws enacted by
congress, to carry into execution the powers vested in the general
government.”228 Furthermore, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution, “[i]t lies within Congressional power
to authorize regulation, including taxation, by the state of federal instrumentalities,” and “Congress may protect its agencies from the
burdens of local taxation.”229 The federal statutes exempting the Entities and FHFA, while supreme to the state transfer tax statutes, also
provide exemptions that are clear and unambiguous, and plainly provide that the Entities and FHFA “shall be exempt from all taxation
now or hereafter imposed . . . by any State county, municipality, or
local taxing authority . . . .”230
Moreover, the Wells Fargo decision is not controlling in any
form or fashion because Wells Fargo dealt with an exemption of specific property from taxation, not excise taxes imposed on an entity.231
The federal exemptions provided by Congress give broad exemptions
225.
12 U.S.C. §§ 1452(e), 1723a(c)(2), 4617(j)(2) (emphasis added).
226.
M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 318-19 (1819).
227.
Osborn v. U.S. Bank, 22 U.S. 738 (1824).
228.
Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 27 U.S. 449, 467 (quoting M’Culloch, 17
U.S. at 317 (1819) (internal quotation marks omitted).
229.
E.g., Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 446 (1943) (emphasis added).
230.
See supra Part III.
231.
See Hager v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 882 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112 (D.D.C. 2012).
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to the entities themselves.232 The Bismarck Lumber decision, however, is controlling because Bismarck concerned an almost identical tax
exemption of an entity.233 The Court in Bismarck held that the statutory exemption incorporated a state sales tax that was an excise tax
that taxed the entity itself, rather than specific property.234
Finally, even if each of the above arguments should fail, FHFA
is a federal agency charged with conservatorship of Fannie and Freddie.235 As such, under FHFA’s control, Fannie and Freddie are not
liable for state imposed transfer taxes because FHFA is clearly exempt from “all taxation” by any local taxing authority.236 As presented, it is legally intuitive that state and local taxing authorities cannot
tax Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and FHFA. In the words of a savvy,
tough Navy Judge Advocate: “You can’t handle the truth!”237
LARS OKMARK*
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